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Abstract  The paper provides an analysis of efficiency in the care for the elderly sector in 
Norway. In a first step we perform DEA analysis to calculate the degree of efficiency in each 
municipality and the national level efficiency potential. The analysis reveals substantial 
variation in efficiency across municipalities, and the national level efficiency potential is 
calculated to 10%. Tobit regressions and recently developed bootstrap methods are applied in 
a second stage to explain the variation in efficiency. The second stage analyses indicate that 
high fiscal capacity, a low degree of user charge financing, and a fragmented local council are 
associated with low efficiency. 
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 1   Introduction 
 
In the next decades the number of elderly people will increase sharply in most West European 
countries due to increased longevity and the large cohorts born in the years after WWII. This 
wave of the elderly puts pressure on public budgets, and pension reforms are heavily debated 
in most countries. The wave of the elderly will also increase the demand and need for health 
services and elderly care. Since the pressure on care for the elderly will come 10-15 years 
later than the pressure on pensions, the debate regarding the future organization and financing 
of elderly care has hardly started. However, efficiency is likely to be a key issue when the 
future organization and financing are to be discussed. 
 
There are several contributions in the literature that calculates the efficiency potential in the 
care for the elderly sector, and in particular nursing homes. Among these are the Dutch 
analysis by Kooreman (1994), the Swiss studies by Fillippini (2001) and Crivelli et al. (2002), 
the Danish study by Hougaard et al. (2004), and the Finnish study by Laine et al. (2005). In 
the US literature the focus has been on efficiency differences between for-profit and not-for-
profit organizations, e.g. Nyman and Bricker (1989) and Vitaliano and Toren (1994). 
 
The first contribution of this paper is to add an efficiency analysis of the care for the elderly 
sector in Norway to the international literature.
1 As in the other Scandinavian countries, care 
for the elderly is a municipal responsibility, and the DEA analysis is carried out at the 
municipal level and includes both home based care and nursing homes. The analysis reveals 
substantial variation in efficiency across municipalities, and the national level efficiency 
potential is calculated to 10%. A possible objection to these interpretations is that it is hard to 
capture all aspects of output, and in particular service quality is hard to measure. For a sub-
sample of the municipalities we have access to a novel data set on service quality, and there is 
no evidence that high calculated efficiency is associated with low quality. 
 
Our second contribution is to provide an extensive analysis of variation in efficiency across 
municipalities. The international literature has emphasized the roles of ownership (public 
versus private) and objective (for-profit versus not-for-profit), but such factors are of little 
relevance in the Scandinavian context where care for the elderly is a municipal responsibility 
                                                 
1 Earlier Norwegian contributions include Edvardsen et al. (2000) and Kalseth (2003). 
  1and there are few private providers. We analyze efficiency as a municipal decision involving 
local democracy, and focus on the fiscal capacity of the municipality, the degree of user 
charge financing of the care for the elderly sector, as well as political institutions. The 
variation in efficiency is analyzed using Tobit regressions and bootstrap procedures developed 
by Simar and Wilson (2007). The second stage analyses indicate that high fiscal capacity, a 
low degree of user charge financing, and a high degree of party fragmentation are associated 
with low efficiency. It is an interesting finding that user charge financing may reduce the 
pressure on public budgets in two ways, by replacing public funds and by reducing 
inefficiencies. The impact of user charge financing is robust to use of instruments. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The principles of DEA analysis are discussed in 
Sect. 2, while Sect. 3 provides institutional background and specifies the production function. 
The results are presented in Sect. 4 (DEA) and Sect. 5 (determinants of efficiency). 
Concluding remarks are offered in Sect. 6. 
 
2   Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
 
We analyze efficiency in the care for the elderly sector using data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). This nonparametric method is based on Farrel (1957) and extensions of his work by 
Charnes et al. (1978). Within the DEA approach, the technical efficiency of a production unit 
is measured relative to a best practice reference frontier, which is calculated from the data. 
Efficient units are located on the frontier, while inefficient units are located inside the frontier. 
The DEA method easily handles multiple outputs and inputs and does not require information 
on neither inputs nor outputs prices, and is for these reasons widely applied to analyses of 
public services. 
 
The principles of the DEA method are illustrated in Figure 1, where a single output is 
produced by a single input. The four units of production are labeled A, B, C, and K. The 
location of the frontier depends on whether we assume constant returns to scale (CRS) or 
allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). With constant returns to scale the best practice 
reference frontier is represented by the line OO’ that runs through the origin and observation 
B, the unit which has the highest output-input ratio. Unit B is located on the frontier and is 
fully efficient, whereas the other observations are inefficient since they are located below the 
frontier. Given the CRS frontier, unit K can reduce its input use from n to e without reducing 
  2output. The input oriented efficiency score (eI) is calculated as hi/hK, and the efficiency score 
is lower the longer the distance from the observation to the frontier. The interpretation of the 
efficiency score is that if unit K was fully efficient, input could be reduced by (1-eI)100% 
without reducing production. Alternatively, an output oriented efficiency score (eO) can be 
calculated as nK/nq. In this case the interpretation is that production can be increased by  









Fig. 1. The best practice reference frontier under constant and variable returns to scale 
 
When variable returns to scale is allowed, the best practice reference frontier is given by the 
piecewise linear curve passing through the observations A, B, and C. Now units A, B, and C 
are characterized as technically efficient since they are located on the frontier, while unit K is 
still inefficient.
2 However, the input oriented efficiency score of unit K increases to hj/HK 
and the output oriented efficiency score to nK/nr. These differences between CRS and VRS 
hold in general. By assuming VRS, both the number of efficient units and the average 
efficiency score increases compared to CRS. 
                                                
 
In the DEA analyses carried out in this paper we rely on VRS
3 technology for two reasons. 
First, there is substantial variation in the scale of operation across Norwegian municipalities 
due to variation in population size. The population size varies from a few hundred inhabitants 
 
2 With VRS one can separate between two types of efficiency, technical efficiency and scale efficiency. We use 
the term efficiency synonymous to technical efficiency. Strictly speaking, A and C are technically efficient, but 
not scale efficient. 
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  3in the smallest rural communities to more than 500,000 in the capital Oslo. Economies of 
scale is clearly of relevance for the smallest municipalities, and the largest ones may 
experience diseconomies of scale. Second, VRS is preferable in the second stage analysis 
where we aim at explaining variations in efficiency across municipalities. In that context we 
do not want to characterize municipalities as inefficient simply because they do not operate on 
an efficient scale due to low population size. It is the variation in technical efficiency that we 
attempt to explain in the second stage analysis. 
 
There are several limitations to the use of DEA. First, the number of efficient units and the 
calculated efficiency potential depend on the number of inputs and outputs relative to the 
sample size. For a given sample size an increase in the number of inputs and/or outputs will 
increase the number of efficient units and reduce the calculated efficiency potential (Zhang 
and Bartels 1998; Perelman and Santín 2008). It is important to formulate a proper model 
specification since an overspecified model (with many outputs and inputs) may underestimate 
the efficiency potential, whereas an underspecified model (with few outputs and inputs) may 
overestimate the efficiency potential. Second, the DEA method is sensitive to measurement 
errors and outliers that tend to overestimate the efficiency potential. The reason is that outliers 
with high levels of output and/or low input use will affect the position of the frontier and 
thereby reduce the efficiency score of other units. Outliers with low levels of output and/or 
high input use will only have a minor impact since they only affect average efficiency by 
making themselves less efficient. In the empirical analysis we perform Jackknifing to 
investigate whether the results are sensitive to outliers and measurement errors. We also 
perform a test of the model specification in the second stage analysis. 
 
3   Institutional context, users, and specification of the production function 
 
In the Scandinavian countries, and also in Norway, care for the elderly is primarily a 
municipal responsibility.
4 The municipalities operate nursing homes and provide home based 
care, and do also determine the type of service and amount of care for individual users. 
Private alternatives are few, and most private providers operate on contract for municipalities. 
The municipalities are multi-purpose authorities, and the care for the elderly sector 
‘competes’ with other sectors over the municipal budget. In addition to care for the elderly, 
                                                 
4 Assous (2001) discusses the organization of care for the elderly in a comparative perspective. 
  4the municipalities are responsible for welfare services like child care, primary health care, and 
primary and lower secondary education. Other important tasks are culture and infrastructure. 
As the largest service sector, care for the elderly amounts to more than ¼ of the total 
municipal budget and nearly 3% of GDP.  
 
The main revenue sources for Norwegian local governments are taxes (45% of current 
revenue), grants (35%), and user charges (15%). Interest and other revenue account for the 
rest. Compared to most other countries, the system of financing is quite centralized. Around 
95% of local taxes are income and wealth taxes where effective tax limits have been in place 
for the last 25 years. The opportunity to influence current revenues is limited to property tax 
and user charges. 
 
Within the care for the elderly sector it is common to separate between two types of users, 
those who receive care in their own home (or a specially adapted dwelling)
5 and residents in 
nursing homes. Residents in nursing homes are on average older and less capable of 
functioning than users of home based services. In 2003, the year under study, 80% of the 
users received home based care and 20% were patients in nursing homes. Home based care 
and nursing homes are highly integrated, and it is difficult to split the resource use on the two 
activities. The appropriate level of analysis is therefore the care for the elderly sector in total, 
i.e. both home based care and nursing homes. Our study is in this respect similar to the Danish 
study by Hougaard et al. (2004), but differs from the vast majority of international studies that 
analyze nursing homes only. 
 
The main challenge for efficiency analyses of care for the elderly is to measure output. The 
ideal indicators of output would capture improvements in health status and improved 
functioning in daily life, but they are obviously difficult to measure. The practical solution in 
the literature is to measure output based on the number of users, and to divide the users into 
groups with homogenous treatment within groups and heterogeneous treatment across groups 
(e.g. Nyman and Bricker 1989; Kooreman 1994; Vitaliano and Toren 1994; Hougaard et al. 
2004). 
 
                                                 
5 Specially adapted dwelling is a recent phenomenon, and has the advantage that it offers great flexibility with 
respect to the amount of care. The level of care varies from a level similar to private homes to around the clock 
services as in institutions.  
  5In home based care the users are divided into three groups on the basis of the type of service 
they receive. The first group consists of users that receive practical help (34%), the second 
group of users that receive home nursing care (29%), and the third group of users that receive 
both practical help and home nursing care (37%). We expect the third group (both practical 
help and nursing) to have the greatest resource requirements. 
 
Residents in nursing homes receive around the clock services, and there is currently no 
information on the type of services each individual patient receives. We have chosen to 
separate the residents on the basis of the length of stay, i.e. whether they are on permanent 
stay (86%) or short-term stay (14%).
6 Residents on short-term stay are younger and more 
vigorous than those on permanent stay, and may therefore require fewer resources than 
residents on long-term stay. On the other hand, residents on short-term stay often need 
treatment or rehabilitation before they can move back to their home. An advantage by the 
DEA procedure is that we do not need to determine a priori which group that has the greatest 
resource requirements. The weights of the different user groups are endogenously determined 
as part of the DEA analysis. 
 
Our specification of the production function in the care for the elderly sector includes seven 
outputs. Five of these are the user groups discussed above (three in home based care and two 
in nursing homes). In addition we include the share of single rooms in nursing homes as an 
indicator of quality. We also include the share of mentally handicapped to take into account 
that this group has substantially resource requirements. 
 
A possible objection to our specification of the output vector is that it does not explicitly take 
into account that the need for care increases with age. However, age is implicitly taken into 
account because the age composition varies systematically across the groups. Long-term 
residents in nursing homes are older than those on short-term stay. And within home based 
care the average age is significantly higher in the group of users that receives both practical 
help and nursing than in the two other groups. The remaining question is whether age is 
important after type of service is controlled for. We leave this issue for the second stage 
analysis where we investigate whether the variation in efficiency scores is related to the age 
composition of the users. 
                                                 
6 Short-term stays are defined by having limited duration. Typically, stay that last less than three months are 
classified as short-term. 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics of outputs and inputs 
Variable Mean  St.dev.  Min  Max 
Output      
   Nursing homes, permanent residents  83.2  253.6  0  4,411 
   Nursing homes, short-term residents  13.5  42.8  0  769 
   Nursing homes, single bed rooms  84.3  246.8  0  4,400 
   Home based care, practical help  129.2  427.6  0  7,474 
   Home based care, nursing  109.6  212.0  0  2,915 
   Home based care, practical help and nursing  140.9  333.4  0  5,354 
   Number of mentally handicapped  44.5  70.1  0  931 
      
Input      
   Current expenditures  100,475  244,686  5,135  4083,731
Current expenditures are measured in Norwegian kroner (NOK) 1,000. 
 
The production of care for the elderly is labor intensive, and it would be desirable to measure 
input by man years in different categories. But since data for man years are considered 
unreliable, we have chosen to use current expenditures as measure of input. The use of 
expenditures as input implies that the DEA analysis strictly speaking provides a mix between 
technical efficiency (quantities of labor) and prices (cost of labor). 
 
The inputs and outputs in the DEA analysis is summarized in Table 1 along with some 
descriptive statistics. Data are from 2003 and were available for 420 of the 434 municipalities. 
 
4   The results of the DEA analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores calculated from the DEA model are reported in 
Table 2. Mean input oriented technical efficiency is 0.844 when all municipalities are given 
equal weight. This means that the average municipality could reduce expenditures by 15.6% 
without reducing measured output. If we rather rely on the output oriented efficiency scores, 
the average municipality could increase production by nearly 17.6% without increasing 
expenditures. 
 
The mean efficiency score is line with earlier Norwegian studies. Edvardsen et al. (2000), 
who (as us) analyze both home based care and institutions, calculate the mean efficiency 
potential to be 14%. Kalseth (2003), analyzing nursing homes only, report mean efficiency 
scores in the range 0.75-0.84 depending on model specification. Moreover, the Danish study 
  7by Hougaard et al. (2004) report an improvement potential of 20%, while the Finnish study by 
Laine et al. (2005) report a mean inefficiency of 16%. Beyond the Scandinavian countries, the 
efficiency potential is calculated to 11% for nursing homes in Wisconsin (Nyman and Bricker 
1989), to 29% for nursing homes in the New York State (Vitaliano and Toren 1994), to 6% 
for Dutch nursing homes (Kooreman 1994), and to 15% for Swiss nursing homes (Crivelli et 
al. 2002). 
 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores 







Min Q1  Q3 
Input  oriented  72  0.844  0.895  0.525 0.758 0.940 
Output  oriented  72  0.850  0.904  0.506 0.769 0.945 
Technical efficiency based on VRS technology. Population size is used as weight in the calculation of the 
weighted mean. The Q’s are respectively 1st and 3rd quartile. 
 
It is the weighted mean of the efficiency scores that reflects the national efficiency potential. 
The weighted average of the input oriented efficiency score is 0.895, which yields an 
efficiency potential of 10.5%. The calculated efficiency potential reflects substantial variation 
in efficiency across municipalities. The efficiency score varies from 0.52 in the municipality 
with lowest efficiency, to 1 in the 72 municipalities that come out as fully efficient. There is 
also substantial variation among the middle half of the municipalities, nearly 20 percentage 
points. The distribution of the input oriented efficiency scores is illustrated in Figure 2. With 
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  8 
Input and output oriented efficiency scores yield strikingly similar results in Table 2, but this 
is not sufficient to conclude that the two measures are highly correlated. The two measures 
could be weakly correlated, but still have a similar distribution. In our case however, they are 
highly correlated. The rank correlation is above 0.99. In the rest of this section we rely on 
input oriented efficiency scores in order to simplify the presentation. 
 
As discussed in Sect. 2, the calculated efficiency scores may be sensitive to measurement 
errors and outliers. We perform Jackknifing to investigate whether this is a problem in our 
case. Jackknifing means that we leave out each efficient municipality one at a time. In our 
case with 72 efficient municipalities, 72 additional DEA analyses are conducted. When one 
efficient unit is left out, the mean efficiency score of the remaining units will generally 
increase.
7 The efficiency scores are considered to be robust if the increase is small and if the 
ranking of the municipalities is similar to the original ranking. In our case the maximum 
increase in efficiency is 0.3 percentage points and the lowest rank correlation is 0.992, 
indicating that the results are robust to measurement errors and outliers. 
 











Output nursing homes         
   Share of residents on permanent stay  0.843  0.882  0.887  0.860 
   Share of single rooms  0.843  0.888  0.908  0.871 
Output home based care         
   Share of user receiving practical help  0.382  0.327  0.324  0.340 
   Share of users receiving nursing care  0.257  0.282  0.280  0.289 
   Share of users receiving both 
   practical help and nursing 
0.361 0.392 0.396 0.371 
Output  general      
   Share of users in nursing homes  0.210  0.195  0.200  0.203 
   Share of mentally handicapped users  0.103  0.110  0.104  0.104 
Input      
   Current expenditures per user  192.6  267.9  249.4  210.9 
# of observations  72  43  106  420 
The grouping of municipalities is based on input oriented efficiency scores assuming VRS technology. Current 
expenditures per user are measured in Norwegian kroner (NOK) 1,000. 
                                                 
7 Mean efficiency score for the remaining units is unaffected if the unit that is left out is not a reference for any 
ineffective unit. 
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As a first step to characterize efficient and inefficient municipalities Table 3 reports some 
information on service composition and resource use in the care for the elderly sector. It is a 
tendency that the efficient municipalities have a user composition with lower resource 
requirements than the least efficient ones. In home based care the efficient municipalities have 
a lower share of users receiving both practical help and nursing, and in institutions they have a 
lower share of permanent residents and a lower share of single rooms. However, these 
differences in user and service composition are small compared to the difference in resource 
use. The efficient municipalities have expenditures per user 28% below the 10% least 
efficient, and 23% below the 25% least efficient. 
 
Since the efficient municipalities are characterized by low expenditures per user and most 
output measures are based on the number of users, it can be objected that the efficient 
municipalities come out as efficient simply because each user receives less services and/or 
services of lower quality. The opportunity to investigate this objection is limited. If better 
output data were available for most municipalities, they would have been included in the DEA 
analysis in the first place. However, we have access to a survey conducted by the Norwegian 
Board of Health Supervision (Helsetilsynet) in a sample of 73 municipalities. The survey 
contains detailed information about all users of home based care that receives both practical 
help and nursing. We utilize two types of information from the survey. The first is 
information about the number of visits and lengths of visits to each individual user on a 
weekly basis.
8 On the basis of this information we can calculate average hours of assistance 
per user for each municipality in the sample. The second type of information is an evaluation 
of nursing and doctoral supervision for each user, which is given on a 1-4 scale where 
increasing value means better supervision. If the objection is of importance, we will expect 
municipalities with high efficiency scores to have fewer hours of assistance per week and 
lower supervision quality compared to municipalities with low efficiency scores. 
 
                                                 
8 For nursing the survey separates between visits below 15 minutes, visits between 15 minutes and 1 hour, and 
visits above 1 hour. In the calculations we assume that the average length is respectively 10 minutes, 35 minutes, 
and 1 hour and 15 minutes. For practical help we have information on the exact length of visits. 
  10Of the 73 municipalities included in the survey, 65 are included in the DEA analysis.
9 In 
Table 4 these 65 municipalities are divided into groups according to efficiency score. Four 
groups are defined by the quartiles of the sample of 420 municipalities included in the DEA 
analysis, and in addition we report separate figures for fully efficient municipalities and the 
sub-sample of 65. The reported figures are mean values for hours of assistance and 
supervision quality for each group. A first and important observation is that there is no 
tendency that a high efficiency score is associated with few hours of assistance, neither for 
practical help nor nursing. If anything, the relationship goes in the opposite direction. If we 
focus on the aggregate of practical help and nursing, the fully efficient municipalities provide 
17% more assistance than the sample average. And the municipalities with below median 
efficiency (the two lower groups) are on average 13% below the sample mean. When it comes 
to supervision quality, there is some tendency that higher efficiency scores are associated with 
lower nursing supervision quality, but the difference is small in relation to the 1-4 scale. For 
doctoral supervision the most efficient municipalities are on the sample mean, while the least 
efficient group has slightly lower quality than the rest. 
 




Q1 and Q2 
Between 








Hours per week               
   Practical help  2.57  2.65  4.81  4.28  4.60  3.44  0.250 
(0.04) 
   Nursing  4.48  4.80  5.62  4.81  5.04  4.84  0.012 
(0.92) 
   Total  7.04  7.45  10.43  9.09  9.65  8.28  0.143 
(0.26) 
              
Supervision            
   Nursing  2.91  2.89  2.88  2.82  2.77  2.87  -0.151 
(0.23) 
   Doctoral  2.82  2.90  2.93  2.88  2.86  2.87  0.103 
(0.41) 
# of observations  18  18  10  19  15  65  65 
The Q’s refer to the quartiles in the distribution of input oriented efficiency scores in the original sample of 420 
municipalities. The quality of nursing and doctoral supervision is measured on a 1-4 scale. The last column 
reports Spearman’s rank correlations between the efficiency scores and hours of assistance/ evaluation of 
supervision, p-values in parentheses. 
                                                 
9 In terms of efficiency score the 65 municipalities are quite representative of the 420 municipalities in the 
original sample. The minimum input oriented efficiency score is 0.57, mean efficiency score is 0.84, and 23% 
come out as fully efficient. This comes close to the corresponding figures in Table 2. 
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The most right column in Table 4 reports statistical tests of the relationship between the 
efficiency score and hours of assistance per week/ evaluation of supervision. Most 
correlations are insignificant and indicate that there is no systematic relationship between the 
efficiency score and the indicators of service level and service quality. The only significant 
correlation points towards a positive relationship between the efficiency score and hours of 
practical help. Nursing supervision quality is the only indicator that is negatively correlated 
with the efficiency score, but the correlation is weak and far from significant. 
 
It is our interpretation that the complementary analysis in Table 4 provides little or no support 
for the hypothesis that the efficient municipalities come out as efficient simply because they 
provide less services and/or lower service quality. This understanding is in line with Nyman 
and Bricker (1989) who document that there among not-for profit nursing homes is a positive 
relationship between efficiency score and quality (measured by Medicaid certification code 
violations). Their interpretation is that managerial incompetence leads to both low efficiency 
score and low quality. Moreover, Kooreman (1994) find only weak evidence that a high 
efficiency score is associated with low quality (measured by procedures and restrictions on 
visiting hours). 
 
5  Explaining variations in efficiency 
 
We now turn to the issue of how to explain the variation in efficiency documented in Sect. 4. 
Why do some municipalities come out with low efficiency scores, while others are 
characterized as efficient? US contributions (e.g Nyman and Bricker 1989; Vitaliano and 
Toren 1994) have focused on the role of ownership on efficiency in nursing homes, and tend 
to find that for-profit private homes are more efficient than public and not-for profit private 
homes. On the other hand, the Swiss study by Crivelli et al. (2002) finds no significant effect 
of ownership and regulatory settings. In the Scandinavian context, where care for the elderly 
is a municipal responsibility and with only few private providers, ownership can not account 
for the variations in efficiency. The issue must be addressed as part of the municipal decision 
making, and following earlier Norwegian studies of efficiency in the local public sector we 
focus on the roles of fiscal capacity, user charge financing, and political institutions. In the 
background inefficiency is understood as a principal agent problem as originally formulated 
by Niskanen (1975). 
  12 
The fiscal capacity of the municipality is an important economic factor that may affect 
efficiency. Increased fiscal capacity increases the demand for services for the elderly, and the 
service producing agencies may be able to take advantage of the increased demand to enjoy 
more budgetary slack and thereby reduce efficiency. As indicator of fiscal capacity we use a 
“real” per capita revenue measure published annually by the Ministry of Local Government. 
The starting point is the sum of block grants and tax revenues taken from the municipal 
accounts. Since high per capita revenue to some extent is compensation for unfavorable cost 
conditions, the revenues must be “deflated” in order to capture the real differences across 
municipalities. The cost index from the spending needs equalization system is used as 
deflator. It captures unfavorable cost conditions related to population size, settlement pattern, 
the age composition of the population, and social factors. The calculation of the cost index is 
documented in Ministry of Local Government (2006). 
 
As a second economic variable we include the degree of user charge financing. In an analysis 
of cost efficiency in the municipal sewage industry, Borge and Rattsø (2005) find that a high 
degree of user charge financing contributes to lower costs. The underlying theoretical 
argument is developed within a sponsor-bureau model where user charge financing (combined 
with net budgeting) makes slack more costly for the bureau. It is of interest to investigate 
whether user charge financing has a similar effect on efficiency in the care for the elderly 
sector. The degree of user charge financing is measured as user charge revenue as share of 
current expenditures. 
 
With regard to political institutions, several studies of Norwegian municipalities have 
emphasized the impact of political strength. Political strength is shown to reduce 
administrative spending (Kalseth and Rattsø 1998) and to increase efficiency (Kalseth 2003; 
Borge and Naper 2006; Borge et al. 2008). A strong political leadership may have an 
advantage in imposing a hard budget constraint on the service producing agencies, and may 
also have more power in bargains with public sector unions regarding implementation of 
incentive schemes and other means to increase performance. A traditional Herfindahl-
  13Hirschman index has been the most widely used indicator of political strength.
10 The index is 
calculated as 
 










where   is the share of representatives from party p. The index takes the maximum value 
of 1 when a single party holds all the seats in the local council, while the minimum value of 
1/P is attained when the seats are equally divided among the P parties. The index can be 
interpreted as the probability that two randomly drawn members of the council belong to the 
same party. Alternatively, we can say that it captures the number of parties in the local 
council and the distribution of seats among them. The value of the index is reduced 
(fragmentation increases) when the number of parties increases and when the seats are more 
equally divided among a given number of parties. 
p SH
 
In Norway the socialist camp is dominated by the Labour party, while the non-socialist camp 
is more fragmented. As a consequence, there is a positive correlation between the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and the share of socialists in the local council. Since we cannot rule out that 
socialist influence has an impact on efficiency, one could argue that the share of socialists 
should be included in the analysis to get an unbiased estimate of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index. A more substantive argument is that earlier studies have found that a high share of 
socialists is associated with high administrative spending (Kalseth and Rattsø 1998), low 
efficiency in nursing homes (Kalseth 2003), and low educational efficiency (Borge and Naper 
2006). A possible interpretation of these findings is that it may be harder for socialists to 
impose a hard budget constraint on service providers because they are more concerned about 
service quality. 
 
The standard approach in the literature is to analyze the determinants of efficiency using Tobit 
regressions. Tobit is supposed to be an appropriate method since the dependent variable, the 
calculated efficiency scores from the DEA analysis, is censored at 1. However, recent 
contributions (e.g. Xue and Harker 1999; Simar and Wilson 2007) have emphasized two 
                                                 
10 The index was originally developed to measure the degree of concentration in an industry, see Hirschman 
(1945, 1964) and Herfindahl (1950). 
  14possible problems by applying Tobit in this context. First, the efficiency scores are not 
independent observations since the calculation of the efficiency score for one municipality 
necessarily involves all other municipalities in the sample. As a consequence, the error term 
in the Tobit model will be serially correlated and standard inference is not valid. The second 
problem is that the efficiency scores may be biased in finite samples. Simar and Wilson 
(2007) have developed bootstrap procedures to deal with these problems. The bootstrap 
procedures are applied by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) and Latruffe et al. (2008). In both 
studies the bootstrap results were similar to the results from standard methods. We have 
chosen to start out by presenting results from Tobit regressions. In addition we perform 
bootstrapping as a robustness check. 
 
Table 5  The determinants of efficiency 
  A B C D E 
































Share of socialists  -0.002 
(-0.05) 
    
Share of the population in rural areas  0.027 
(0.91) 
    










Share of residents in nursing homes 90 
years and above 
 -0.032 
(-0.41) 
   
Share of users of home based care 90 
years and above 
 -0.080 
(-0.64) 
   
Share of population 0-5 years      -1.480 
(-1.96) 
  
Share of population 6-15 years      0.630 
(1.21) 
  
Share of population 80 years and above     -0.049 
(-0.09) 
  
       
Estimation  method  Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit 
IV 
Log  likelihood  159.8 165.3 161.5 159.3  1380.6 
# of observations  419  411  419  419  419 
Tobit estimates with t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable is input oriented efficiency scores assuming 
VRS technology. In model E the share of elderly 80 years and above is used as instrument for the degree of user 
charge financing. 
 
  15In the regressions presented in Table 5 the dependent variable is the input oriented efficiency 
scores.
11 Model A is the baseline specification. In addition to the four variables discussed 
above, it controls for the two structural characteristics population size and settlement pattern. 
The two economic variables come out as significant and with expected signs. A high level of 
revenue contributes to lower efficiency, while a high degree of user charge financing has the 
opposite effect. Among the political variables, only the Herfindahl-Hirscman index is 
significant. The interpretation of the positive coefficient is that a more fragmented local 
council leads to lower efficiency. 
 
The findings that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation are associated 
with low efficiency is in line with earlier studies of efficiency in Norwegian municipalities, 
e.g. Kalseth (2003) analyzing nursing homes, Borge and Naper (2006) analyzing the 
educational sector, and Borge et al. (2008) analyzing all service sector simultaneously. A 
negative relationship between efficiency and fiscal capacity is also a robust finding in the 
international literature on municipal efficiency, see e.g. the survey by De Borger and Kerstens 
(2000). The evidence on party fragmentation is scarcer, but a recent Belgian study by 
Ashworth et al. (2006) reports similar results as us. 
 
Population size seems to be an important background factor to explain the variation in 
efficiency, and larger municipalities have higher efficiency scores. However, the impact of 
population size does not reflect economies of scale since variable returns to scale is allowed 
for in the underlying DEA analysis. It rather reflects that the variation in efficiency scores 
across municipalities is related to population size, and more precisely that the variation is 
larger among small municipalities. The share of the population living in rural areas comes out 
as statistically insignificant, which indicates that the settlement pattern is of little importance. 
The two insignificant variables, the share of the population living in rural areas and the share 
of socialists in the local council, are not included in the additional equations reported in Table 
5. 
 
The definition of user groups in the DEA analysis is based on type of service, and does not 
take account of age. In model B we control for the age composition of the users by including 
the share of user 90 years and above (separate variables for home based care and nursing 
                                                 
11 Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are reported in Table A1 in the appendix. 
  16homes). The negative coefficients for the two variables are consistent with the hypothesis that 
elderly users are more resource demanding, but the effects are far from being statistically 
significant.
12 The quantitative effects are also modest. A one standard deviation increase in 
the share of users 90 years and above is associated with a reduction in the efficiency score of 
0.3 percentage points (nursing homes) and 0.5 percentage points (home based care). The lack 
of significance of the age composition of the users yields support to our specification of the 
production function. Moreover, the impacts of fiscal capacity, user charge financing, and 
party fragmentation are robust to the control for the age composition of the users. 
 
The age composition of the population is important for the demand for welfare services like 
child care, education, and care for the elderly, see e.g. Borge and Rattsø (1995). These 
services make up a large share of the total budget, and increases in the relevant age groups 
represent fiscal pressure that may promote efficiency. In model C we control for the share of 
the population eligible for child care (0-5 years of age), primary and lower secondary 
education (6-15 years of age), as well as the main target group for elderly care (the share of 
the population 80 years and above). The share of children 0-5 years of age is the only variable 
that comes out as significant, but the negative sign is inconsistent with the fiscal pressure 
hypothesis. Again, signs and significance of fiscal capacity, user charge financing, and party 
fragmentation are robust to the modification of the model. 
 
In model D we report the results from a parsimonious specification including party 
fragmentation, municipal revenue, the degree of user charge financing, and population size. 
We use the parsimonious specification in model D to illustrate the quantitative effects of the 
key variables. Efficiency will be reduced by nearly 1 percentage point if municipal revenue 
increases by 10 percentage points, whereas efficiency will increase by 1.7 percentage points if 
user charge financing increases by 1 percentage point. An increase in party fragmentation by 
one standard deviation is predicted to reduce the efficiency score by 1.7 percentage points. 
Finally, an increase in the population size by 10,000 is predicted to increase the efficiency 
score by 2.3 percentage points. 
 
                                                 
12 One might suspect that multicollinearity is a problem here, but also the joint significance of the two variables 
is clearly rejected. The F statistic (with 2 and 405 degrees of freedom) is 0.36 and the corresponding p-value is 
0.70. 
  17It is an interesting result that a high degree of user charge financing is associated with high 
efficiency. It indicates that more user charge financing may reduce the pressure on public 
budgets in two ways, a direct effect of replacing public funds and an indirect effect through 
increased efficiency. However, it could be objected that the estimated effect is due to a 
mechanical relationship between efficiency and the degree of user charge financing. The point 
is that municipalities with high levels of expenditures tend both to be less efficient (see Table 
3) and to have a low degree of user charge financing (through the definition of the variable). 
This issue is addressed in model E in Table 5 where we instrument the degree of user charge 
financing. As instrument we use the share of the population 80 years and above. This is a 
valid instrument in the sense that it is highly correlated with the degree of user charge 
financing
13 and it satisfies the exclusion restriction (see model C). The degree of user charge 
financing comes out with a positive effect on efficiency also when it is instrumented. Contrary 
to the concern expressed above, the quantitative effect increases. And although the coefficient 
is less precisely estimated, it is still highly significant. 
 
In Table 6 we report additional robustness tests using the parsimonious specification 
(reproduced as model A) as point of departure. The first robustness test (model B) is to use 
output oriented efficiency scores as dependent variable instead of the input oriented efficiency 
scores. Given the high correlation between the two efficiency measures (see Sect. 4), it is not 
surprising that sign and significance of the four variables are unaffected by this modification. 
 
The next step is to apply the bootstrap procedures developed by Simar and Wilson (2007).
14 
They introduce two procedures, a single bootstrap and a double bootstrap. Both procedures 
are based on a coherent data-generating process, which leads to a truncated regression model, 
rather than a Tobit model, in the second stage. The truncated regression model is more general 
than the Tobit model and only utilizes the uncensored observations (the inefficient 
municipalities) when estimating the coefficients of interest. 
 
The first stage of the bootstrapping procedures is to estimate a DEA model as in Sect. 4 of this 
paper. The second stage is to estimate a truncated regression model with the efficiency scores 
from the first stage as dependent variable and the determinants of efficiency as explanatory 
                                                 
13 In the first stage regression the estimated coefficient is 0.553 with a t-value of 8.33. 
14 In the following we provide a brief description of the bootstrapping procedures. The reader is referred to Simar 
and Wilson (2007) for a more thorough description.  
  18variables. The truncated regression model has the same potential problems as the Tobit model, 
i.e. the efficiency scores are serially correlated and the estimates are biased in finite samples. 
The single bootstrap is designed to tackle the serial correlation problem and to improve on 
inference. The estimates are those obtained in the second stage, but bootstrapping is applied to 
obtain an empirical distribution for the estimates. The bootstrapping is performed by 
conducting L drawings of residuals from a truncated normal distribution, and then reestimate 
the truncated regression model for each drawing. 
 
The double bootstrap procedure is designed to tackle both the inference problem and the bias 
problem. After the two first stages described above, L1 drawings of residuals from a truncated 
normal distribution is performed to estimate bias-corrected efficiency scores. These bias-
corrected efficiency scores are obtained by performing L1 additional DEA analyses (one for 
each drawing). Then the double bootstrap estimates are obtained by estimating a truncated 
regression model with the bias-corrected efficiency scores as dependent variable and the 
determinants of efficiency as explanatory variables. Finally, empirical distributions for the 
double bootstrap estimates are obtained in the same way as in the final step of the single 
bootstrap procedure. The number of drawings in the final step is denoted L2. 
 
Table 6  Robustness tests 
  A B C D E 




















Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 





















       
Dependent variable/Efficiency score  Input  Output  1/Output  1/Output  1/Output 




T-values in parentheses. 
 
We have performed single and double bootstrap using the algorithms provided by Simar and 
Wilson (2007). These algorithms are based on a measure of technical inefficiency defined as 
the inverse of the output increasing efficiency score (Shephard’s output distance function). 
We use the same algorithms, and for comparison we first reestimate the Tobit model with this 
  19measure of technical inefficiency as dependent variable (model C in Table 6). As expected, 
the main consequence is that coefficients take on opposite signs compared to model B. 
 
The results from the single and double bootstrap procedures are reported as respectively 
model D and model E. Regarding the number of bootstrapping replications, we follow Simar 
and Wilson (2007) and set L=L2=2,000 and L1=100. It turns out that the bootstrapping 
procedures yields similar results as Tobit in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients. 
The only modification is that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index loses significance with the 
single bootstrap procedure. In terms of quantitative effects however, the double bootstrap 
estimates are substantially larger than the single bootstrap and Tobit estimates.
15  
 
6   Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of the paper was to calculate the efficiency potential in the care for the elderly 
sector in Norway and to analyze variation in efficiency across municipalities. In the first stage 
DEA analysis the national efficiency potential is calculated to 10%. The efficiency potential is 
robust to outliers, and a complementary analysis, covering a sub-sample of the municipalities, 
yields little support to the hypothesis that high efficiency simply reflects low quality. It should 
be noted that the calculated efficiency potential is based on VRS technology and do not take 
account of scale inefficiencies. Allowing for cooperation in services provision or 
consolidation of municipalities would increase the efficiency potential. 
 
In a second stage analysis we performed Tobit regressions and recently developed bootstrap 
procedures in order to explain the variation in efficiency scores across municipalities. The 
qualitative effects are very robust across estimation methods, and the main findings are that 
high fiscal capacity, a low degree of user charge financing, and a fragmented local council are 
associated with low efficiency. The results indicate that user charges may reduce the pressure 
on public budgets in two ways, directly by replacing public funds and indirectly by increasing 
efficiency. The impact of user charges also is significant when the variable is instrumented. 
                                                 
15 Simar and Wilson (2007) and Latruffe et al. (2008) also estimate much stronger quantitative effects with 
double bootstrap compared to single bootstrap. 
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Table A1  Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the second stage 
Variable Description  Mean 
(st.dev.) 
Municipal revenue  The sum of local taxes and block grants 
from the central government. Measured 
per capita and adjusted for spending 




User charge financing  User charges in care for the elderly as 
share of current expenditures 
0.086 
(0.022) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  The inverse of the party fragmentation in 




Share of socialists  The share of socialists in the local council, 
based on the election period 1999-2003. 
0.365 
(0.140) 
Share of the population living in 
rural areas 
The share of the population living in rural 
areas, based on Census data from 2001. 
0.486 
(0.268) 
Population size  Total population, January 1.  10694 
(30441) 
Share of residents in nursing 
homes 90 years and above 
Residents 90 years and above as share of 
the total number of residents. 
0.260 
(0.082) 
Share of users of home based care 
90 years and above 
Users 90 years and above as share of the 
total number of users 
0.118 
(0.051) 
Share of population 0-5 years  The share of the population 0-5 years of 
age, January 1. 
0.074 
(0.011) 
Share of population 6-15 years   The share of the population 6-15 years of 
age, January 1. 
0.139 
(0.014) 
Share of population 80 years and 
above 
The share of the population 80 years and 
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